August 15, the anniversary of the day after Emperor Hirohito accepted terms 
of surrender in the Postdam Declaration in 1945, is approaching. 
Now the question arises: Will Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pay 
visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honours Japan's war dead, including 14 Class 
A war criminals, on August 15 this year, the 61st anniversary of the end of 
World War II in Asia-Pacific? 
There has been widespread speculation as to what will happen, but people 
generally agree that there are three possibilities.
First, Koizumi might refrain from visiting the war shrine, trying not to 
cause trouble for his political heir, since it is now apparent that the Japanese 
citizens opposed to the prime minister's shrine visit outnumber those in favour 
of the visit. 
Second, the prime minister might perform the visit perfunctorily in a largely 
ceremonial way, as he did last year, when Koizumi, in common suit, paid a visit 
but stopped short of entering deep into the shrine compound. This is merely to 
show that he fulfilled his promise of shrine visit.
Third, Koizumi, staking all his political assets, might go all out for a 
full-fledged visit, making good on his pledge to visit Yasukuni on August 15, 
which is likely to be his last visit as prime minister. It should be kept in 
mind that Koizumi steered clear of August 15, a sensitive date, in all of his 
previous Yasukuni visits. 
In case Koizumi's August 15 shrine visit indeed becomes reality, there would 
be a large following, including parliament members and some members of the 
general public. In this way, Koizumi actually stages a showdown with the 
Japanese who are opposed to the visit and with the countries in Japan's 
neighbourhood, which were victims of Japanese aggression or colonial rule. 
In this scenario, Koizumi could stoke extra-nationalist feelings among the 
Japanese public and challenge China and the Republic of Korea.
For a long time, Koizumi has twisted the issue of his war shrine visits into 
a matter of whether Japan should bend to the "pressure from China." It, 
therefore, follows that those Japanese who disagree with the prime minister's 
war shrine visit favour submission to China. A climate is thus created in which 
those who are opposed to the shrine visits are traitors. 
The last choice is doubtlessly the worst one. Three factors probably drive 
Koizumi along this road. 
First, the Japanese economy is in good form current and Koizumi's approval 
rating remains high. 
The economy is a vitally important factor that determines the approval 
ratings of Japanese leaders. But the good economic situation is not so much 
attributed to Koizumi's economic policy as to a stroke of his good luck. 
The No 1 stimulus for Japan's economic recovery comes from the enormous 
demand from China. Moreover, the US economy, the world's economic locomotive, is 
also doing well.
But all in all, it was during Koizumi's tenure that the Japanese economy 
started making a turn for the better. This, coupled by Koizumi's publicity 
efforts, easily leads the Japanese public to believe that the incumbent prime 
minister is worth supporting. 
Second, the influence of the overwhelming victory scored by the ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party in the general election last September lingers on. If 
that marked the victory at the showdown with the domestic opposition, now it is 
time to stage a diplomatic coup. The premiership of Koizumi would be thus 
rounded off by victories in both domestic and international arenas. 
Third, the nice treat Koizumi enjoyed during his US visit and the praises US 
President George W. Bush lavished on him are enough to make him feel buoyant. 
In spite of the fact that US public opinion resents the attitudes of some 
Japanese politicians towards the trials at the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East and is critical of Koizumi's war shrine visits, George W. Bush, 
a realist, however, will not put the matters of historical and moral right and 
wrong before the United States' interests. 
However, the Yasukuni Shrine issue goes beyond the scope of China-Japan 
relations. Japanese leaders' war shrine visits not only sting the feelings of 
the Chinese but also aim to reverse the historical verdict on the war launched 
by Japanese militarists. The United States, which played a primary role in the 
trials of the Far East tribunal, actually bears the brunt of such 
verdict-reversing attempts. 
Conservative Japanese politicians over the last decades have basically 
acknowledged that the war against China was aggression and that Japan imposed 
colonial rule on Korea. But what they are most reluctant to acknowledge is the 
fatally erroneous decision to provoke the war with the United States. The 
exhibits in the Yasukuni Shrine, for example, have connotations obviously 
targeting the United States. So, we can safely draw the conclusion that 
conservative Japanese politicians largely have the United States in mind when 
interpreting the history of World War II. 
Koizumi is merely a political gambler, not a politician with strategic 
insight and perspective. 
Koizumi pales beside a number of Japan's post-war prime ministers: Yusuhiro 
Nakasone, as prime minister from 1982-87, stood out with his strategic 
perspective involving Japan-China relations; Kakuei Tanaka came to Beijing in 
1972 to establish formal diplomatic relations with China; Tanzan Ishibashi 
(1956-57) excelled in political farsightedness. 
In addition, the patent of pushing for structural reform in Japan as an 
"ordinary country" belongs to Seiji Maehara, head of Japan's major opposition, 
the Democratic Party, who stands more than a cut above Koizumi in terms of 
strategic wisdom.
Though the Chinese Government never refuses to have dealings with 
conservative and right-wing Japanese politicians, the Chinese leadership finds 
it hard to reason with a political gambler whose head is reason-proof. 
Japanese economist Yutaka Kosai observed that co-operation with China on 
environmental issues, energy saving initiatives and in other respects is the 
biggest issue Japan has to address in the 21st century. 
His remarks reflect farsightedness. 
He continued to say that Japan-China relations cannot afford any more twists 
and turns. 
If Koizumi is bent on having his way and chooses to visit the war shrine on 
August 15 on the eve of his exit from the prime minister's office in a bid to 
fan nationalist feelings among the Japanese public, he will end up in becoming a 
historical sinner. 
The author is a senior research fellow from the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
(China Daily 08/12/2006 page4)